skip to main content
US FlagAn official website of the United States government
dot gov icon
Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.
https lock icon
Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock ( lock ) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Explore Research Products in the PAR
It may take a few hours for recently added research products to appear in PAR search results.


  • Home
  • Search Results
  • Page 1 of 1

Search for: All records

Creators/Authors contains: "Huang, Yih-Fang"

Note: When clicking on a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number, you will be taken to an external site maintained by the publisher. Some full text articles may not yet be available without a charge during the embargo (administrative interval).
What is a DOI Number?

Some links on this page may take you to non-federal websites. Their policies may differ from this site.

  1. ; ; ; ; (, IEEE Internet of Things Journal)
    Full Text Available 
  2. ; ; ; ; (, IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Processing over Networks)
    Full Text Available 
  3. ; ; ; ; (, IEEE Internet of Things Magazine)
    Full Text Available 
  4. ; ; ; ; (, 2022 56th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers)
    Full Text Available 
  5. ; ; ; (, IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing)
    Full Text Available 
  6. ; ; (, 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC))
    Consider a setup in which a central estimator seeks to estimate an unknown deterministic parameter using measurements from multiple sensors. Some of the sensors may be adversarial in that their utility increases with the Euclidean distance between the estimate of the central estimator and their own local estimate. These sensors may misreport their measurements to the central estimator at a falsification cost. We formulate a Stackelberg game in which the central estimator acts as the leader and the adversarial sensors act as the follower. We present the optimal linear fusion scheme for the estimator and the optimal attack pattern for the adversarial sensors in the Nash equilibrium sense. Interestingly, the estimate at the central estimator may be better than if the measurements from the adversarial sensors were altogether ignored. 
    more » « less
    Full Text Available